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Land Use and Climate Change: Effects and Solutions at The Local Level
Mark Henderson, Ph.D.1
Introduction
China is likely already seeing the effects of climate change. Further effects in the form of
increased temperatures, changing precipitation patterns, and rising sea levels could be
catastrophic, making action at all levels an urgent priority. While much attention is rightfully
paid to reducing carbon emissions from fossil fuels, land management practices account for
as much as a quarter of the net increase in greenhouse gasses. In China, urbanization is the
most important and tractable phenomenon affecting the landscape, reducing carbon
sequestration, as well as locking in transportation patterns that assume increasing fossil fuel
use into the future. Developing systems for carbon-negative land management will have
benefits at the local and global scales, serving as an insurance policy against the increasingly
negative consequences of climate change.
In this paper, I review the linkage between land use patterns and climate change. In
China, central government policies aimed at curbing urban expansion and preserving
agricultural land have faced difficulties in implementation, as local officials respond to other
policy signals and economic incentives. A review of the local effects of climate change on
some of China’s most prosperous regions suggests that, if these were properly accounted for,
many local leaders could see net benefits from investing in carbon-negative land
management. I conclude by considering some policy reforms that can be taken by local and
central governments to promote beneficial practices at multiple levels.
Land Use and Climate Change
Anthropogenic climate change has emerged as the foremost environmental challenge of our
time. The increase of atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO2, the dominant greenhouse gas) has
been linked directly to the rise in fossil fuel use as the Industrial Revolution has spread
around the world. As such, the greatest amount of attention has been given to efforts to limit
new carbon emissions through political, economic, and technical means (Fleming 1998;
Houghton, Jenkins, and Ephraums 1990; Watson 2001; Depledge and Lamb 2003). But the
absorption of carbon from the atmosphere by vegetation—completing the “carbon cycle”—is
attracting increasing attention, with proposals that land use management practices may be key
to meeting the challenge posed by global warming.
Land resources can act as either sources or “sinks” of carbon. Forests are one oftgiven example: growing trees take in carbon from the atmosphere, sequestering it until they
are burned or decomposed. Agricultural crops also sequester carbon during the growing
season (see Figure 1). Changes in land use can affect the flow of carbon: forests cleared by
burning release their carbon back into the atmosphere, while land taken out of agricultural
production is no longer able to play its role in the cycle. As climatic variation affects
vegetation growth patterns, climate change and land use change are intertwined in a feedback
loop, each affecting and being affected by the carbon cycle (Adger and Brown 1994: 5-9;
Matthews et al. 2000).
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Carbon Storage Capaticty (t C / ha)

Figure1. Carbon Storage Capacity of Land Cover Types. After Matthews et al. 2000.
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Governments and international organizations are already considering how land
management practices that sequester carbon can be encouraged, and perhaps credited against
a country’s share of global carbon emissions. The Kyoto Protocol included provisions to
account for afforestation efforts, although it should be pointed out that new forests do not
always enhance carbon sequestration if they replace other well adapted land cover types, such
as grasslands or peat bogs (Watson et al. 2000: 16; Adger and Brown 1994: 49-54). True
carbon-negative land management systems in any environmental setting would be designed
to enhance cyclical and secular carbon sequestration, as well as incorporating urban design
features that minimize transportation-related carbon emissions.
In China, with its recent history of rapid development and its billion-plus population
seeing living standards rise, emissions from industry and a booming transport sector have
risen sharply to surpass those of the United States (Energy Information Administration 2009).
Meanwhile, land use change in China is also expected to reduce carbon sequestration, further
contributing to atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations. Researchers of the Harvard
University Committee on the Environment’s China project have estimated that the growth of
net carbon emissions from China could offset the reductions proposed by all of the other
countries in the world, combined (McElroy 1997; McElroy and Nielsen 1997).
The greatest effects of China’s land use change on the global carbon cycle may have
already happened. Reconstructing a three hundred-year history of forest cover, Woods Hole
Research Center scientists estimated that 180 million hectares of forest land have been lost
since 1700, releasing 17 to 33 Pg (billion metric tons) of carbon into the atmosphere. The
annual average emissions of up to 110 million tons over three centuries was far exceeded in
the Maoist era, when mass campaigns promoted accelerated clearing, with emissions perhaps
reaching 500 million metric tons in peak years. But expanded afforestation drives since the
1990s suggest a reversal of China’s net carbon flux, making China’s remaining forest lands
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an important sink for atmospheric carbon (Houghton and Hackler 2003; see also Shapiro
2001, chapter 2).
China’s agricultural lands, which sequester only one-third to one-fourth as much
carbon per hectare as growing forests, have come to occupy a greater share of China’s
landscape. And agricultural lands are under greater threat from urban expansion. An
analysis of night time satellite imagery found that China’s city lights had increased in area by
over half, from 4.40% of the country’s land area in 1992-93 to 7.03% in 2000. Seen by day,
those same areas were nearly twice as likely to see declines in vegetation (Henderson 2004:
9-12, see Figure 2). In terms of carbon storage, the conversion of that much cropland to
urban areas could result in a reduction of 300 million tons annually—around twice the carbon
sequestration capacity of the forests of the United States (Adger and Brown 1994: 49;
Myneni et al. 2001: 14788).
Figure2. Land Cover Change: Urban (DMSP) and Vegetation (NDVI) dimensions, 1992-93 to 2000.
Source: Henderson 2004.

Nearly one-fifth of China’s agricultural lands fall within 8 km of expanding urban
areas. Though the total land area affected by urban expansion is a relatively small share of
China’s territory, such areas have a disproportionate effect on the overall trend of decreasing
vegetation. Typically, labor and fertilizer inputs have made farmland close to urban
settlements the most productive, and these are the lands most likely to have seen both urban
expansion and decline in vegetation.
Land use change must be considered not only for its immediate effects on the carbon
cycle, but also for the long-term patterns of future emissions that are locked in place by
choices about land development and, especially, transportation. The development of urban
forms that emphasize reliance on the automobile, energy-intensive buildings, and external
resources will produce greater carbon emissions. The energy and resources required to
maintain complex urban systems must be drawn from an even wider swath of the landscape,
what some have called the “ecological footprint” (Lin 2001; Qi et al. 2004). Together, the
expanding physical and ecological footprints of cities have become the most significant
forces reshaping China’s landscape (Watson et al. 1997: n.p.).
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Climate Change and Land Policy: Tension between Central and Local Goals
There are signs that the Chinese central government recognizes the importance of combating
climate change in order to live up to its aspirations as a leader in the international community
as well as to avoid further domestic consequences. Top leaders have begun to attach greater
importance to “environmental security” (huánjìng ānquán), listing global climate change
among their major concerns (Guojia Huanjing Baohu Zongju 2002). While the Chinese
negotiating posture leading up to the 2009 Copenhagen climate talks calls for highly
aggressive cuts in carbon emissions by developed nations in advance of any mandatory limits
for China and other developing countries, within its borders the government has taken
significant steps to promote more environmentally friendly technologies and public works
projects—far surpassing the “green” stimulus spending of any other country (Yang and Oster
2009; Qi 2009; Jacobs 2009).
Still, there are limits to the central government’s capacity to carry out “green” reforms
even if there were a political consensus to do so. Although conservation of agricultural lands
has returned as a key issue in national policy (Rozelle and Rosegrant 1997), the central
government cannot act alone to control land use in the thousands of towns and villages across
China. It must rely on agents at the local level to monitor land uses and enforce conservation
policies. Under China’s system of collective land ownership, most rural households’ rights to
use land is subject to the control of local officials, who retain the authority to allocate and
reallocate land (Christiansen 1986: 21-3). These officials, situated at the nexus of state power
and local interests, often have divided interests—their responsibilities to higher authorities
may conflict with community pressures and incentives for personal gain (Brown 1995: 922).
At the village level, almost all economic and political motivations favor industrial
development over the preservation of agricultural land. Every peasant farmer knows that
factories, not farms, are the key to rapid wealth. Besides filling the pockets of their
constituents, village leaders have another incentive to divert land to industrial development:
factory profits are subject to a different taxation system than agriculture, leaving more in
local coffers and sending less to the central government (Oi 1992; Whiting 2000). Not
surprisingly in this context, compliance with land conservation policies has historically been
low.
Another major challenge to the central government’s attempt to regulate land
conversion has been the lack of reliable, detailed statistics on local land management. Land
use statistics, produced unreliably at the township level, were filtered and aggregated as they
were reported up the bureaucratic hierarchy, resulting in an undercount of at least 40 percent
(Smil 1995: 805; Crook 1993; Ash and Edmonds 1998: 845; Smil 1999; Cartier 2001; U.S.
Embassy Beijing 1997a, 1998; Lin and Ho 2003). Without private property rights to land,
government officials at the township level or above did not systematically track who held and
exercised land use rights; a national land registration system only went into effect in 2008
(Shandong interview 2001, Asia Pulse 2008).
Turning to satellite surveys of land use and urban growth as an independent source of
data, in the late 1990s China’s State Council launched a nationwide campaign to protect land
resources. Directives called on “the whole nation to pay more attention to the protection of
arable lands” and banned unauthorized conversions of forest and agricultural land (Xinhua
1997b, 1997a, 1998; Zhang et al. 2000; Xu, Qi, and Gong 2000). A mounting sense of crisis
prompted central officials to invoke a “broad-brush” policy that left little room for adaptation
to local conditions.
Meanwhile, the desire to jump-start local economies stalled by the Asian financial
slowdown prompted a resurgence in the creation of local economic development zones, with
some six thousand such zones opened from 2000 to 2003 (Cartier 2001; Zhang 2004). These
zones made use of a loophole in the 1998 Land Administration Law that allowed cities to
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requisition surrounding farmland for planned urban expansion (Skinner, Kuhn, and Joseph
2001). In the past decade, such land requisitions have become a common source of friction
between local officials and displaced farmers, resulting in protests and thousands of lawsuits
nationwide.
Faced with discontented farmers, reports of profiteering by local officials, and
renewed concern about food security, top leaders again confronted the question of
agricultural land conservation with two important policy changes. First, the State Council’s
Document Number 1 in early 2004 reiterated the policy of “strictly protecting farmland,”
requiring provincial or higher-level approval for conversions (Associated Press 2004).
Secondly, the principle of compensation for land appropriation was formalized as part of a set
of amendments to the national constitution (Xinhua 2004). Accompanying regulations
specified how compensation could be assessed for displaced farmers, their village collectives,
and local governments; these costs can amount to RMB ¥160,000 per hectare (Zhang 2004).
By 2008, satellite imagery indicated that the pace of unauthorized land conversions had
slowed, but some 31,000 suspected violations remained under investigation (Xinhua 2008a,
2008b)
While the policy of requiring no net loss of farmland continues, regulations are vague
about where compensatory land may be reclaimed. Fresh vegetables for the city of Beijing
are now being shipped in from farmland hundreds of kilometers away, rather than being
produced locally as was true just a decade or two ago (Skinner 1985; Qi et al. 2004). Perhaps
influenced by the ongoing xībù dà kāifā (Great Development of the West) campaign,
developers in Dalian have invested in land reclamation in Xinjiang, some three thousand
kilometers to the west (Zhang 2004). Indeed, Xinjiang, Ningxia, and the Tibetan
Autonomous Region in the far west of the country accounted for most of the reclaimed
farmland reported in recent years (Wang 2000: 652-3; 2001: 706-7). Such remote land
reclamation projects do nothing to achieve the stated goal of balanced land use within
provinces, to say nothing of the increased carbon emissions from transporting food from
more distant sources.
Localized Effects of Climate Change
A growing understanding among national leaders of the potential consequences to
China of global climate change may have contributed to the decision to sign the Kyoto
Protocol, as well as to take other measures on this issue (U.S. Embassy Beijing 1997b; Chen
2002). Several analysts have shown how interactions among Chinese and international
scientists have helped develop this understanding within the Chinese bureaucracy, along with
the technical capacity to predict potential consequences and implement beneficial policies
(Henderson 1994; Ross 1998; Economy 1999).
Given the importance of local enforcement to ensure the success of any policies to
combat climate change, especially policies related to land use, consideration needs to be
made of the motivations of local officials. While normative exhortations and bureaucratic
enforcement will both have their place (Skinner and Winckler 1969; Ross 1988), I suggest
that attention to the incentive structures under which these officials operate will have the
most immediate and long-lasting results.
Appeals to localities’ own self-interests—producing “win-win” situations—should be
made wherever possible. Co-benefits to the local economy and environmental conditions
must be emphasized. While this is difficult in the case of global climate change, where
effects are often far displaced from the sources of the problem, some local effects of carbon
emissions can be pointed out. As it happens, some of the most prosperous localities in China
(and those with the highest carbon emissions) also face some of the greatest risks under
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future climate scenarios; as such, these regions have both the wherewithal and the incentive
to invest in emissions-reducing land management practices.
According to the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, “three
subregions in north China appear to be especially sensitive to climate change because of
potential increases in the soil moisture deficit.” Climate models indicate that areas of the
North China Plain can expect “more frequent and severe spring droughts” and changes in
seasonal temperature patterns that will “make it difficult to maintain current crop patterns …
limiting the present practice of double-cropping in succession” (Watson et al. 1997, chapter
10)
Such climate changes have already begun to appear, revealed in weather station data
collected by Chinese authorities over the past half-century.
Liu et al. (2003) found
statistically significant warming trends across China, especially in the north (see figure 3).
As night time low temperatures have increased faster than daytime highs, the daily
temperature range has decreased—a fact of importance to cropping patterns. To give one
example, rising temperatures trimmed 2.4 percent from growth in wheat yields between 1979
and 2000 (Fang and Yang 2008: 272). For the 300 million residents of the region, warmer
nights bring less relief in heat waves, linked to increased mortality. For those who can afford
it, this climate trend spurs the demand for air conditioning—and for electric power from coalfired power plants, further contributing to anthropogenic climate change.
Figure 3. Daily Temperature Range: Trends, 1955-2000. Source: Liu et al. 2004.

Total precipitation in all seasons, especially the summer rainy season, has also
decreased across northern China while increasing in the flood-prone Yangzi River basin (see
figure 4). Of even greater concern, the frequency of precipitation events has decreased at a
greater rate in all regions and seasons, meaning that even if there is less total precipitation, it
comes in more intense storms, with implications for soil erosion and flooding (Liu et al.
2005). Many other climatic variables show similar spatial and temporal trends, with turning
points toward less favorable conditions from around 1978–1990.
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Figure 4. Summer Precipitation: Trends, 1960-2000. Source: Liu et al. 2005.

Of all of the projected effects of global climate change, rising sea levels are among
the most alarming and contentious. A minimum increase of around 1 meter is expected in the
coming century due to the expansion of ocean water under warmer global temperatures, with
some substantial variations around the world’s coastlines (IPCC Working Group 2007).
Substantial additional increases—to 10, 20 meters or more in the long term—are expected as
the Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets recede. Recent reports indicate this may be happening
faster than previously acknowledged by the IPCC (Hansen 2007; Kerr 2008).
Figure 5. Population Centers in Relation to Elevation above Current Sea Level. Source: Township
Population Census of China, 2000; GTOPO30 Digital Elevation Model.
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In China, where large areas of land has been reclaimed from the sea over centuries
(Elvin 1993; Marks 1997) and where an increasing population has been drawn to new
economic opportunities in coastal cities, sea level rise could have catastrophic consequences.
While a 1-meter rise in sea levels may sound minor, coupled with increasing storm surges it
would require a major engineering effort to protect heavily developed coastlines (Revkin
2009). As shown in Figure 5, large tracks of Jiangsu province and much of the North China
Plain are very close to sea level; the Pearl River Delta around Guangzhou and Hong Kong is
similarly situated. Nationwide, up to 16 million people live within 2 meters of sea level and,
with gradually rising sea levels, will require increasingly expensive protective measures, or
decisions to relocate.
Even as seas rise, low-lying areas in the North China Plain are experiencing land
subsidence related to groundwater depletion. Considering areas currently up to 5 meters
above sea level, there are 45 million more people potentially affected by seawater incursions,
including most of the major metropolises of Tianjin and Shanghai.
Should the Greenland or West Antarctic Ice Sheets collapse, as some fear, either
could add up to 10 meters to current sea levels worldwide; in China, another 90 million
people would be affected—including nearly all of Jiangsu province. While the collapse of
the East Antarctic Ice Sheet is considered the least likely, it could raise sea levels 25 meters
or more, with another 138 million people affected in China. Under such a scenario, presently
landlocked Shenyang and Ji’nan would face typhoon storm surges, and tidal flows would
reach up the Changjiang to Wuhan.
In short, depending on which level of risk you want to consider, sea level rise could
affect the homes and livelihoods of around 300 million people in China—approximately
equal to the entire population of the United States (see figure 6). Because the regions at risk
include some of the most developed in China, the value of the infrastructural investments
potentially in harm’s way—water control structures, ports, highways and railroads, urban
developments, and improved agricultural lands—could exceed more than one-third of the
country’s total.
Figure 6. Population by Elevation above Current Sea Level. Source: Township Population Census of
China, 2000; GTOPO30 Digital Elevation Model.

Engineering solutions to protect against these risks would require enormous
expenditures. Attempted on a piecemeal basis under crisis conditions, construction of new
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water control structures could only defend the most valuable urban centers. With sufficient
advance planning more land could saved behind seawalls, levees, and locks, but displacement
of many people and industries would be unavoidable. Estimation of these costs, even under
conservative estimates of possible harm, are needed so that they can be weighed against
proposed measures to mitigate these consequences of global climate change.
A “win-win” alternative to these dire projections would involve adapting land
management practices in these areas to promote carbon sequestration and reduce
transportation-related carbon emissions. Local jurisdictions at risk of negative consequences
from climate change, whether in terms of rising temperatures, water shortages, or flooding,
can view investments in carbon-negative land management systems as an insurance policy
that will have benefits whether or not the worst predictions come to pass.
There is some evidence that communities that are more prosperous are more willing
to make expenditures or forego some economic growth in order to achieve environmental
aims. The hypothesized “Environmental Kuznets Curve” suggests that “smokestack”
industries and loss of biodiversity are seen as the necessary price of progress as societies
industrialize, but that beyond a certain point societies place an increasing value on
environmental amenities like clean air and open space. A recent study suggests that China’s
coastal provinces may have passed that point, showing declines in sulfur dioxide, an air
pollutant of local and regional concern (Fang and Yang 2008: 237; see also Auffhammer and
Carson 2007). If true, and if local leaders can be provided with sufficient information to
assess the current and prospective costs of climate change, we may look to these more
developed communities to lead progress on carbon-negative land management systems.
Policies for Carbon-Negative Land Management at The Local Level
Some of the most promising political developments on global climate change since the 1997
Kyoto Protocol have come from local governments and communities worldwide. Even in the
United States, where the Federal government failed to ratify the protocol, numerous localities
adopted their own “climate action plans” to reduce carbon emissions. Localities on Taiwan,
too, have been successful in making progress on climate issues without being a Kyoto
signatory. In these cases, local officials were often swayed by members of civic
environmental organizations. China too has seen a notable rise in environmental NGOs,
often focused on protecting local natural resources. If given the political space to become
informed about the effects of global climate change on local environments, these domestic
environmentalists may help shape and implement carbon-negative land management
practices in key areas of China.
There is no time to lose in setting China’s urbanization and land conservation policies
on a more sustainable footing. Land conservation policies must be carried out at the local
level by officials who are faced with other conflicting political and economic signals. While
the central government is increasingly stressing the importance of agricultural land
conservation, most local officials will still be swayed—short of a campaign on the order of
the One Child policy—by other signals in the political and economic environment. These
include policies of the central government itself that have countervailing effects, as well as
issues that have been a source of recurring tension between central and local interests.
Development of the Transportation Infrastructure
From the Grand Canal to railroads and most recently superhighways, the construction of
transportation infrastructure has always hastened urbanization. New roads literally pave the
way for more labor intensive and higher value industries. The mode of transportation access
may have long-lasting effects on the form of urbanization that takes place. Railroads have
the benefit of requiring relatively little land; their effect on land use is concentrated around
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stations and spurs through industrial districts, and, especially if electrified, they are relatively
benign in terms of energy efficiency and pollution. Since 1990, the North China rail network
has grown from three long-distance lines to more of a grid, linking every regional city and a
growing number of lower-order settlements. With the anticipated addition of high-speed
links between metropolises, this network can be the basis of a sustainable transportation
system for passengers and freight.
The new long-distance superhighways, though, promote another source of urban
expansion altogether. They require significantly more land for the roadways and
interchanges, not to mention the accompanying infrastructure of feeder routes, gas stations,
parking lots, and the other accoutrements of the automobile society. The Chinese
government’s stated goal of producing 10 million cars annually, much of which are to be sold
domestically (People's Daily 2003) is indirectly a land use policy, because it promotes a
vision of automobile-oriented development as China’s future. With China now the world’s
third largest oil importer (Xinhua 2003), concerns about national security may join air
pollution and land management as reasons to shift course. Putting greater priority on
developing local roads—building connections within regional city systems—while favoring
rail for long-distance connections would be an improvement.
Reform of Economic Development Zones
As noted above, development zones have been promoted by locales eager to attract outside
investment—and to skirt rules for converting agricultural land within zone boundaries. Much
has been written on the proliferation of these zones and the central government’s periodic
campaigns to revoke thousands of zone designations made by local authorities (Chung 1997:
148; Cartier 2001). In the present economic environment, the proliferation of development
zones across the landscape makes little sense from the national perspective, especially when
such zones are concentrated in areas that already have the economic advantages of
convenient transport and bureaucratic infrastructure.
To break the cycle of establishing and abolishing development zones, one approach
would be to overhaul the complex land permitting and taxation system, with infinite local
variations, that has evolved over the past quarter-century. With a more uniform system,
locales would compete for investment on the basis of the structural advantages, rather than
with creative loopholes. With the shift back from “letting some regions get rich first” to the
promotion of more spatially balanced development, subsidies should be available for regions
falling behind the national average.
Priority Farmland Zones and Ecological Services
Another kind of zone designation that has spread rapidly across the landscape putatively
reserves highly productive land for agricultural use in perpetuity, or at least requires greater
scrutiny at higher levels (and higher costs for would-be developers) before conversion can
take place. Surveys to identify and post signs around these zones have been seen in
prefectures from Dalian to Lhasa. At a higher scale, entire counties have been labeled
“national grain bases.” Clear signals from authorities about the permitted future uses of land
are to be welcomed, as contrasted with the “give it today, take it back tomorrow” approach to
land use rights that has been seen too often over the past half-century (Grinspoon 2002: 27).
But there remains the implication that communities consigned to the agricultural sector will
be excluded from the benefits of economic development and urbanization.
In these circumstances, transfer payments for “ecological services” provided by these
communities should be considered. International economic incentives for tree-planting and
other beneficial land management practices are already being tested as part of the
international negotiations on climate change. If widely adopted, these could provide a legal
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framework for transferring funds to regions that continue to provide important ecological
services (Daily 1997; Prugh, Costanza, and Daly 2000). Farmers and foresters would receive
a greater share of the economic benefits that they provide to society at large from
participating in carbon-negative land management systems.
Conclusion
Some of these policy recommendations echo directives that are already being put into effect
in China; others will require greater coordination between central and local officials or
structural changes to be effective. All will depend on more widespread understanding of the
likely local consequences of failure to act on global climate change. While any local actions
on this global issue are subject to fears about free-riding by communities that would reap
benefits without sharing the costs, China’s local leaders have, in aggregate, the resources to
affect a phenomenon of planetary scale. In the words attributed to Benjamin Franklin, “we
must all hang together, or we will assuredly hang separately.”
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